ABSTRACT Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has a broad developing prospect in fine-grained sharing of ciphertext in the background of cloud computing. However, most of ABE schemes have a potential security risk called key escrow problem because users' secret keys are issued by a trusted attribute authority (AA). Moreover, the pairing and exponential operations are heavy for users who are resource limited. In this paper, we introduce a semi-trusted organization called ministrant attribute authority (MAA). Based on our proposed master-key and parameters (MAP) transform, we construct a key issuing protocol where AA and MAA not only cooperate with but also restrain each other skillfully to generate users' secret keys. These keys can be utilized directly for outsourced decryption. Based on the MAP transform, the key issuing protocol and an ABE scheme, we propose a generic construction of outsourced ABE without key escrow (OABE-WoKE). We provide security definitions for three types of adversaries where AA and MAA are included, and we are the first to prove that the construction is CPA secure against any one of the three types of adversaries. Finally, we provide two instantiations of OABE-WoKE schemes. Analyzing the simulation of them, we can conclude that they are more efficient than their competitive schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the advantages of cloud computing, such as convenience and high scalability, have drawn more and more people's attention. One of the most attractive applications of cloud computing is on-line data sharing [1] . It is convenient for users who want to save their local storage space to upload their private data to cloud. Meanwhile, it also leads to a challenge. To ensure the privacy of data owners and the security of data, data owners need to encrypt their sharing data before uploading it. Therefore, fine-grained access control is urgently needed. ABE has been proposed as a promising technique to tackle the mentioned challenge. The concept of attribute-based encryption is put forward by Sahai and Waters [2] . ABE schemes can be divided into two kinds, key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [3] , [4] and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [5] - [7] according to the access policy is related to the secret key or the ciphertext. CP-ABE is considered as a more adaptive scheme to realize access control for the reason that the policy is decided by the user instead of the authority.
However, there are some open problems preventing ABE from being implemented in a cloud application.
The first open problem is called the key escrow problem. This issue can be viewed from two aspects: (1) attribute authority (AA) can decrypt any ciphertext using its master key. (2) AA can dishonestly generate secret keys that are related to an arbitrary set of attributes or access structures for users. Both of the two aspects stand against the willings of the users. Its enormous power in the system is a potential threat.
The second open problem is that the number of pairing operations needed in the decryption grows linearly with the number of attributes in the related access policy. It would be a great challenge for users who are resource limited to complete the decryption independently.
The two mentioned problems are particularly outstanding while employing an ABE scheme directly into a cloud application. The first problem is a potential threat to the security and privacy of the data stored in the cloud applications. The second problem seriously affects the practicability of the system. Hence, both of the problems need to be solved urgently.
To make the ABE available in cloud applications, in this paper, we target at the above two problems and put forward a generic construction of OABE-WoKE to solve them.
A. RELATED WORK
The concept of ABE can be traced back to the work of Sahai and Waters in 2005, fuzzy identity-based encryption (IBE) [2] . ABE can be divided into two kinds: CP-ABE and KP-ABE. In a KP-ABE scheme, ciphertexts are labeled with sets of attributes and users' private keys are related with access policy. In a CP-ABE scheme, users' secret keys are associated with a lot of attributes, and data owners generate the ciphertext where the access policies are embedded. In an ABE scheme, only when the attributes satisfy the target access policy can the users decrypt the ciphertext. In 2007, Bethencourt et al. proposed the first CP-ABE scheme [5] . After that, many CP-ABE schemes with specific characteristics have been studied [6] - [11] .
Most of the existing ABE schemes have one fully trusted AA. Using its master key, AA can generate arbitrary keys to users or decrypt arbitrary ciphertext. Thus, the single-authority ABE scheme has the key escrow problem inevitably. Multi-authority ABE schemes can be divided into two kinds. One kind is the centralizing multi-authority ABE scheme [9] , [11] . It has key escrow problem due to its central authority. The other kind is decentralizing multi-authority ABE scheme [7] , [10] , which can also be subdivided into two kinds. One kind has independent authorities, and still has key escrow problem because each authority still has enormous power in its responsible attribute domain. The other kind requires each authority to work with each other, and does not have key escrow problem, but the efficiency can still be improved. Chase and Chow [10] presented a KP-ABE scheme to solve the key escrow problem. In the approach, there is no centralized authority, every honest authority works together to generate users' secret keys, and these authorities are linked with each other tightly due to an anonymous ABE key issuing protocol. However, their solution needs O(N 2 ) communication overhead in the setup phase of the system. It requires each user to store O(N 2 ) auxiliary key components except his own secret key, which leads to performance degradation [11] .
It's worth mentioning that Li et al. [12] solved the key escrow problem by presenting an excellent patientcentric framework based on a multi-authority ABE scheme (e.g. [10] ). In the present paper, an approach from different aspect is proposed to further improve the efficiency.
Hur et al. [13] solved the key escrow problem by adding a new key issuing protocol in [5] . Besides the traditional authority key generation center (KGC), they introduced another authority, attribute authority (AA). In the key issuing protocol, AA cooperates with KGC to generate one component of user's secret key, but KGC cannot know that component. Hence, the scheme can solve the key escrow problem in a certain degree. However, the key issuing protocol invokes a secure two-party computation (2PC) protocol that needs several additive homomorphic encryption schemes and several corresponding interactive zero knowledge proof protocols [10] , [14] , [15] , which increases the computation and communication overhead of the system. Recently, Wang et al. [16] solved the key escrow problem with the thought similar with [13] . They proposed an improved key issuing protocol which the key authority (KA) and cloud service provider (CSP) take part in. Similar with [13] , there also exists several interactive zero-knowledge proof protocols in the key issuing protocol.
Moreover, the key issuing protocols in [10] , [13] , and [16] all require specific form of user's secret key. It is difficult for these schemes to achieve universality. The last but not least, in the security models in [13] and [16] , the two key generators are restricted to obtain a secret key from any user, it is not a good description of actual scenes.
Hence, the solutions to key escrow problem can still be improved in universality, security and practicability. Firstly, to make it more generic, we intend to give a generic construction of ABE without key escrow. Secondly, considering the actual situation, to make the scheme more robust, more types of adversaries need to be defined in the model to represent key generators. Thirdly, to make ABE available in cloud computing, we also need to support outsourced decryption simultaneously when solving key escrow problem, and we need to improve the efficiency of the scheme.
B. OUR TECHNIQUES
To achieve the above mentioned three improvements, we follow the general thought of [13] , [16] , and introduce a semitrusted organization, MAA. We create a master-key and parameters (MAP) transform which is crucial to our construction. It is a generic method and can transform the variables used in public key and secret key into new ones and keep the form of the public key and secret key unchanged.
For the first improvement, we put forward a key issuing protocol where AA and MAA not only cooperate with but also restrain each other skillfully to generate public key of the system and users' secret keys. The protocol adopts MAP transform to achieve that all component rather than some specific components of user's secret key are generated cooperatively by AA and MAA. Based on our proposed key issuing protocol and an underlying ABE scheme, we present a generic construction of OABE-WoKE.
For the second improvement, considering the actual scenes, we formalize the security requirements and provide security definitions for three types of adversaries where AA and MAA are included. According to the core idea that neither AA nor MAA has a system-wide master key or parameters, we give our proof in the generic bilinear group model. We stress that, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to prove our construction to be CPA secure against any one of the three types of adversaries.
For the third improvement, the keys generated by the protocol can be utilized directly for outsourced decryption.
Our construction to solve the key escrow problem can support outsourced decryption inherently.
C. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
The contribution of this paper lies in three aspects:
• In the aspect of model, we put forward a generic construction of OABE-WoKE that matches most of ABE schemes; we are the first to provide security definitions for three types of adversaries where the two key generators are included. Then we prove the construction to be CPA secure against any one of the three types of adversaries.
• In the aspect of method, we construct our MAP transform and our key issuing protocol which are the foundation of the construction. The mechanism to solve the key escrow problem can support outsourced decryption inherently.
• In the aspect of application, we implement comprehensive experiment for two instantiations of OABE-WoKE schemes. The simulation shows that our instantiations are more efficient than their corresponding competitive schemes.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR MAPS
Let G 0 and G 1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, the generator of G 0 is g. Let e : G 0 × G 0 → G 1 be a bilinear map satisfying the following properties:
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1;
• Computability: For all u, v ∈ G 0 , there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v).
We say (G 0 , G 1 ) is a bilinear group pair and e is a bilinear map from G 0 to G 1 .
B. DEFINITION FOR ABE
Definition 1 [18] : We define S and as an attribute set and an access structure respectively, and let I key and I enc refer to the inputs to the algorithms of key generation and encryption respectively. In a CP-ABE scheme, (I key , I enc ) = (S, ) and in a KP-ABE scheme, (I key , I enc ) = ( , S). The function f is defined as:
1, if I enc ∈ I key in KP-ABE setting 1, if I key ∈ I enc in CP-ABE setting 0, otherwise.
Definition 2:
An ABE scheme whose attribute universe and access structure space are U and P respectively, consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup(1 λ , U ). The system setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and an attribute universe U . It outputs public key PK and master key MK .
KeyGen(I key , MK ). The key generation algorithm takes as input an attribute set (resp. access structure) I key and the master key MK . It outputs a private key SK .
Encrypt(PK , M , I enc ). The encryption algorithm takes as input the public key PK , a message M and an access structure (resp. attribute set) I enc . It outputs a ciphertext CT .
Decrypt(SK , CT ). The decryption algorithm takes as input a private key SK and a ciphertext CT . It outputs a message M or a failure symbol ⊥.
Note that in Encrypt, there exists Y ∈ G 1 that blinds M directly, M ·Y . It will serve as the encapsulated key, key, when considered in an AB-KEM scheme [18] .
Correctness:
, the correctness of an ABE scheme requires that, if f (I enc , I key ) = 1, Decrypt(SK , CT ) outputs M , otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
C. THE GENERIC BILINEAR GROUP MODEL
We prove the security of the construction of OABE-WoKE in the generic bilinear group model introduced by Shoup [19] . Let ξ 0 and ξ 1 be two random encodings of an additive group F p , they are injective maps:
In the model, the adversary is given access to the oracles that simulate the hash function, group operations in G 0 , G 1 and the non-degenerate bilinear map e : G 0 × G 0 → G 1 . We let G 0 denote a generic bilinear group. [20] ): Let X denote a multiplicative group and Z be the set of integers. A randomized polynomial-time computable algorithm T : X → Z × X is an endomorphism transform if it satisfies the following three properties:
D. ENDOMORPHISM TRANSFORM

Definition 3 (Endomorphism Transform
(1) Invertibility: there exists a polynomial-time function T −1 such that for any x ∈ X and any (T 1 , T 2 (x)) ∈ T (x), T −1 (T 1 , T 2 (x)) = x. Here T 1 refers to the secret output and T 2 (x) refers to the public output.
(2) Indistinguishability: the public outputs {T 2 (x) : x ∈ X} are all indistinguishable from each other, it equals to,
Here ≈ refers to computational indistinguishability.
(3) Endomorphism: the public output T 2 : X → X is an endomorphism on the multiplicative group X, it equals to,
To make it more specific, let us look back at the key blinding technique proposed in [21] . It randomly chooses a blinding factor z ∈ Z * p , where p is a prime number. The transformation key TK is produced by TK = SK 1/z . The blinding factor z serves as the retrieving key RK .
This actually defines an endomorphism transform T on a cyclic group X of prime order p as It is easy to verify that the technique is an endomorphism transform on a group with prime order.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY DEFINITION A. ENTITIES IN SYSTEM MODEL
The system model of OABE-WoKE is shown as Figure. 1. There are five entities in the OABE-WoKE scheme, AA, MAA, User, DO and Cloud. We provide detailed description of these entities as follows.
Attribute Authority (AA): AA is a semi-trusted entity in the model. AA needs to cooperate with MAA to generate public key of system and secret keys of users. It is also responsible for authenticating the user, sending retrieving key of AA to the user.
Ministrant Attribute Authority (MAA): MAA is a semitrusted entity in the model.MAA needs to cooperate with AA to generate public key of system and secret keys of users. In addition, it needs to authenticate the user and send retrieving key of MAA to the user.
Data Owner (DO):
The data owner owns the data which is stored in the cloud. He executes data encryption algorithm. The generated ciphertext is uploaded to cloud by him.
User: As a data consumer, the user asks AA and MAA for transformation key and retrieving key. The user can decrypt the ciphertext by himself or outsource the decryption to cloud.
Cloud: The cloud in the system is assumed to have a mass of storage space and powerful computing capacity. Users can upload and download the ciphertext stored in cloud freely. To reduce users' computation burden, the cloud is responsible for outsourcing decrypting the ciphertext and sending the partial decrypted ciphertext to the user.
B. ALGORITHMS IN SYSTEM MODEL
We define the model of OABE-WoKE with an attribute universe U for an access structure space P by the following polynomial-time algorithms. They can be divided into four sections.
Section 1 (Initialization):
This section contains two algorithms: AA.Setup and MAA.Setup.
• AA.Setup(1 λ , U ). This algorithm is run by AA, it takes a security parameter λ and attribute universe U as input and it returns a partial public key PK AA and AA's master key MK AA .
• MAA.Setup(PK AA ). This algorithm is run by MAA, it takes the partial public key as input, it returns public key PK and MAA's master key MK MAA . Section 2 (Key Generation): This section includes three algorithms: AA.GenTK, MAA.GenTK and KeyGen.
• AA.GenTK (I key,AA , MK AA ). The algorithm is run by AA, it takes I key,AA and AA's master key MK AA as input, it returns retrieving key of AA, RK AA,I , partial transformation key TK AA,I and an auxiliary set R ξ .
• MAA. • Encrypt(PK , M , I enc ). The algorithm is run by a data owner, it takes as input the public key PK , a message M and an access structure I enc ∈ P for CP-ABE (I enc ⊆ U for KP-ABE). The output is a ciphertext CT .
Section 4 (Decryption):
This section includes three algorithms: Transform out , Decrypt out and Decrypt. The user can use the first two algorithms to outsource the decryption to the cloud or do the work by himself, he can also utilize the third algorithm to do the decryption using his secret key.
• Transform out (TK I , CT ). The algorithm takes as input a transformation key TK I and a ciphertext CT , it outputs a partial decrypted ciphertext CT .
• Decrypt out (RK I , CT , CT ). The algorithm takes as input a retrieving key RK I , a partial decrypted ciphertext CT and a ciphertext CT . It outputs the message M or a terminator ⊥.
• Decrypt(SK I , CT ). The algorithm takes as input a secret key SK I and a ciphertext CT . It outputs the message M or a terminator ⊥.
and Decrypt(SK I , CT ) output M ; Otherwise, the two algorithms output ⊥.
C. SECURITY DEFINITION 1) ADVERSARIAL MODEL
We suppose AA and MAA in our model are semi-trusted (honest-but-curious). More specifically, they will follow the protocol but try to find out as much private information as possible. They may collude with dishonest users, however, we assume AA and MAA can not collude with each other. The channels used to dispense retrieving key in the key issuing protocol are secure. We thus consider three types of adversaries:
• Type-1 adversary can obtain the secret keys of corrupted users. It views the phases of setup and key generation as an integral whole respectively.
• Type-2 adversary refers to corrupted users colluding with AA, it can obtain the secret keys of corrupted users. In addition, it has the master key of AA and parameters used in AA.Setup and AA.GenTK. It can not collude with MAA.
• Type-3 adversary refers to corrupted users colluding with MAA, it can obtain the secret keys of corrupted users. In addition, it has the master secret key of MAA and parameters used in MAA.Setup and MAA.GenTK. It can not collude with AA.
2) SECURITY MODEL
We define three types of security games for the mentioned three types of adversaries. Let A i be a type-i adversary i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and C be the challenger to simulate an OABE-WoKE scheme.
CPA Security Game for Type-1 Adversary Exp IND
Setup. C runs AA.Setup and MAA.Setup, then transmits the public key PK to A 1 . Phase 1. C sets an empty table E, an empty set D and an integer j = 0. A 1 adaptively issues the following queries:
• Transformation key query, on input I key : C sets j := j + 1, runs AA.GenTK and MAA.GenTK, it stores in table E the entry (j, I key , TK I , RK I ), then it returns transformation key TK I to A 1 .
• Retrieving key query, on input index i: If there is an i th entry in 
Challenge, Phase 2 and Guess are the same as the CPA security game for type-1 adversary. Setup and Phase 1 in the CPA security game for type-3 adversary are:
Setup. C runs AA.Setup, then transmits the partial public key PK AA to A 3 . A 3 runs MAA.Setup and returns PK to C. Phase 1. C sets an empty table E, an empty set D and an integer j = 0. A 3 adaptively issues the following queries:
• Partial transformation key query, on input I key : C sets j := j + 1, runs AA.GenTK, stores in 
Selective Security: An OABE-WoKE scheme is selectively secure if we add an Init stage before Setup where the adversary commits to the challenge I * enc . VOLUME 6, 2018
IV. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION OF OABE-WoKE
In this section, we introduce MAP transform, based on that transform, the key issuing protocol and a CPA secure pairingbased ABE scheme, we give the generic construction of CPA secure OABE-WoKE, then we give the security proofs.
A. MAP TRANSFORM
We define a transform called master-key and parameters (MAP) transform, it consists of three algorithms, F 1 , F 2 and F 3 . They are used to transform the variables used in PK and SK in a pairing-based ABE scheme into new ones and keep the form of PK and SK the same. Let G 0 and G 1 be the two used multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order, the generators of G 0 and G 1 are g and g 1 respectively. Let T = (T 1 , T 2 ) be an endomorphism transform.
is a pairing-based ABE scheme and assume the variables used as exponents in PK and SK are T = (t 1 , t 2 , ..., t p ), where
F 1 takes as input, it outputs an entry which is used as a specification by F 2 and F 3 . F 2 and F 3 then concretely achieve the transformation. F 1 ( ) consists of the following four steps:
Step 1:
, where d 1 ∈ R Z * is a variable, then it selects the components of PK that are in G 0 and G 1 as set X 0 , and the components of T 2 (SK ) that are in G 0 and G 1 as set X 1 ,
Step 2: Define a variable θ ∈ R Z . It needs to select m i ∈ Z , i ∈ [1, p] that hold in the equations (1),(2),(3),
where
Step 3: It needs to determine (k 1 , ..., k p ), k i ∈ {0, 1}. To determine them, it analyzes each possible case of (k 1 , ..., k p ) by using a loop. Convert index j into a binary number and let
Similarly, it gets CT j from CT . Define PK j , TK j and SK j as:
The requirements of ω j are: Req-1. Consider it in the generic bilinear group model, the algorithm enumerates over all possible query types into G 1 by means of the defined operations in from PK j , SK j and CT j , and puts them into set j . It needs to guarantee that, compared with j , it can not construct any new element in G 1 that does not contain {θ, t 1 , ..., t p } by using (6), (7), and the auxiliary sets R j ⊆ T 2 (PK ) can be generated to satisfy equations (8), (9) .
Req-2. It needs to hold in the equations
Step 4: Traverse all ω j , if there is no solution, it outputs ⊥, or it selects the entry whose total computation cost in H j is minimal. Let it be the ξ th entry. It outputs the specification
To make the logic clearer, the function F 1 can be rewritten as Algorithm 1. Followings are three notations for the algorithm.
• P i (A). It is the function that selects all the components of set A that is in group G i , i ∈ {0, 1}.
• Replace(A, B, C). let A = (a 1 , ..., a n ), B = (b 1 , ..., b n ), the function replace each a i by b i for each element in set C.
• (j) 2 . It means converting the number j into a binary number.
F 2 (PK , θ, ). The algorithm generates all related parameters according to , combined with θ and PK , it substitutes them into formulas (2), (3), (6) and (7) in F 1 to transform X 0 into X 0ξ . Then it generates PK ξ according to formula (4) in F 1 , the output is PK = PK ξ . F 3 (TK , θ, R ξ , ). The algorithm generates all related parameters according to , combined with θ, TK and R ξ , it substitutes them into formulas (2), (3), (8) and (9) in F 1 to transform X 1 into X 1ξ . Then it generates TK ξ according to formula (5) in F 1 , the output is TK = TK ξ .
We note that in the second step in F 1 , at least m i = 0, i ∈ [1, p] is a solution to equations (1), (2) and (3); in the third step, when considering Req-1, there at least exists a feasible solution ω j = (1, ..., 1). The solutions can meet Req-2 if the construction of public key and secret key is not too complex. Actually, most existing pairing-based ABE (KP or CP) schemes satisfy the two requirements. Thus, our MAP transform can be applied to most existing ABE scheme in both KP and CP settings.
There may exist some more efficient algorithms to determine the solution in the third step in F 1 . However, this is not the focus of our research, thus we put forward the most direct method, traverse all the possibilities in the loop to obtain the solution, and it is also within limits of acceptability because the related variables are not too many. 
w j = (k 1j , k 2j , ..., k pj ) 13 :
14:
15:
16:
define PK j , TK j and SK j as (4), (5), CT j = Replace(T , T j , CT ) 18: if ω j holds in Req-1 then 19: if ω j holds in Req-2 then 20: put (j, ω j , R j , x, H j ) in select the item whose total computation cost in H j is minimal.
32: end if
Take the KP-ABE scheme in [12] as an example, in that scheme, PK = {g,
Assume α = α θ m 1 + k 1 α , r i = r i θ m 2 + r i , where the variables θ, α , r i ∈ R Z p . In step 2, we obtain m 1 = m 2 , m 2 ∈ R Z p . In step 3, we determine (k 1 , k 2 ), when (k 1 , k 2 ) = (0, 0), we analyze all the possible combinations and conclude that it is the solution and the corresponding R = {φ}.
B. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION
We give the generic construction of CPA-secure OABEWoKE from a CPA secure pairing-based ABE scheme, the key issuing protocol and the MAP transform. Note that our construction can be also applied to selectively CPA-secure pairing-based ABE systems. Then, the resulting ABE systems are selectively CPA-secure. Let =(Setup',KeyGen',Encrypt',Decrypt') be an pairing-based ABE scheme, (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 ) be the MAP transform, and T = (T 1 , T 2 ) be an endomorphism transform. We define the inverse transform of T as T −1 and execute The key issuing protocol is constituted by AA.GenTK and MAA.GenTK , it is described in Fig. 2 .
C. SECURITY PROOF OF CONSTRUCTION
Theorem 1:
The constructed OABE-WoKE scheme is (selectively) CPA-secure with respect to Definition 4 (i=1) under the assumption that the underlying ABE scheme is (selectively) CPA-secure.
Proof: Assume that there is a PPT Type-1 adversary A 1 that has a non-negligible advantage to attack IND-CPA security of the OABE-WoKE scheme, we can build a simulator B to attack the underlying pairing-based ABE scheme =(Setup',KeyGen',Encrypt',Decrypt') in the IND-CPA secure game with non-negligible advantage. Let C be the challenger corresponding to B in the CPA-secure game of . B runs A 1 executing the following steps.
• Setup. C runs (pk, mk) ← Setup'(1 λ , U ), B gets the public key PK = pk from C and forwards it to A 1 .
• Phase 1. B sets up an integer j = 0, an empty E, and an empty set D. A 1 can adaptively issue the following queries.
For transformation key queries, B sets j := j + 1, sends I key to C and obtains , T (d 1 d 2 , TK ) ) to A 1 ; if no such entry exists, it returns ⊥.
• Challenge. A 1 submits two equal length messages M 0 , M 1 and I * enc where f (I key , I * enc ) = 1 for any I key in set D. B forwards them to C and gets CT * from C. Then B sends CT * to A 1 as the challenge ciphertext.
• Phase 2. A 1 continues to adaptively issue the queries of transformation key, retrieving key and secret key with the restriction that f (I key , I * enc ) = 1 for any I key in set D. B answers the queries as in Phase 1 except that for transformation key queries, if f (I key ,
, then returns to A 1 the simulated transformation key TK I = (I key , T 2 (SK )).
• Guess. A 1 outputs its guess b of b. Then B outputs its guess b to C. Notice the fact that B does not simulate the process of the OABE-WoKE scheme does not matter. That is because that the cooperation between AA and MAA in the Setup and Phase 1 are hidden from A 1 , and the simulated public key, transformation key and secret key have the same construction as the real ones. A 1 can distinguish these simulated keys from the real ones with at most negligible probability. Therefore, except with negligible probability, B has perfectly simulated the IND-CPA security game of the OABE-WoKE scheme for A 1 . If A 1 can win the IND-CPA security game of the OABE-WoKE scheme with non-negligible advantage , B can attack the IND-CPA secure ABE scheme with nonnegligible advantage .
Theorem 2: Assume the underlying pairing-based ABE scheme is IND-CPA secure and ξ 0 , ξ 1 , G 0 , G 1 are defined in section II.C. For any type-i adversary A i , i ∈ {2, 3}, let q be a bound on the total number of group elements it receives from queries it makes to the oracles for the hash functions, groups G 0 and G 1 , the bilinear map e, and from its interaction with the security game for A i , then the advantage of A i in its security game is bounded by O(q 2 /p).
Proof: We use the generic bilinear group model and random oracle model to prove that no A i , i ∈ {2, 3} can break CPA security of OABE-WoKE scheme with non-negligible probability. Our security proof technique partly follows (but not limited to) that of [5] .
In the challenge phase of the security game for A i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the simulator B will construct either M 0 Y or M 1 Y as the component in the challenge ciphertext, where Y is defined in Definition 2, we assume Y = e(g, g) , ∈ Z p . Here we consider a modified game where that component is replaced by either Y or e(g, g) δ , δ ∈ R Z p and the adversary needs to decide which is the case. It is not difficult to see that any adversary in the security game with advantage ε can be transformed into an adversary in the modified game with advantage at least ε/2. Then, we do the proof in the modified game. Then we consider unexpected collisions. Each oracle query can be viewed as a rational function ϑ = λ/ψ over related variables. A collision happens when two queries corresponding to two different rational functions map to the same output, that is ϑ = ϑ , then λψ − λ ψ = 0. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [22] , [23] , the probability of the event is O (1/p) . Hence, the probability of such collision event is no more than O(q 2 /p), in turn, the unexpected collusion will not happen with probability 1 − O(q 2 /p).
Owing to the uniform representation and independent choice of each group element in the generic bilinear group model, the only way for the adversary to tell the difference between δ and elements in G 1 is if there are two distinct queries ϑ and ϑ leading to the same output. Assume ϑ = γ δ and ϑ = γ , then γ δ + ϑ − ϑ = γ , where γ and γ are non-zero constant. Hence, the conclusion that adversary can not construct a query for γ in G 1 from the information given is equivalent to the conclusion that, in the defined generic bilinear group model, the advantage of adversary in its security game is bounded by O(q 2 /p).
According to the assumption that is IND-CPA secure, we have that Theorem 1 holds, since the ability of A 1 in the generic bilinear group model is not bigger than that in the original model and the security game is the same, we have that in generic bilinear group model, the OABE-WoKE scheme is IND-CPA against A 1 . Hence, A 1 can never construct a query for γ in G 1 from all information given in the simulation.
Firstly, we prove A 2 can never construct a query for γ in G 1 from all information given in the simulation. The query types in G 1 that A 2 can construct can be divided into two parts. Part one is all the query types in G 1 from A 1 , it has been proved that using this part can not construct a query for γ in G 1 . Part two is the extra query types in G 1 from A 2 compared with those from A 1 . Since (θ, t 1 , ..., t p ) are not relevant to constructing a query involving γ , according to Req-1 in the third step in F 1 , it guarantees that compared with part one, A 2 can not construct any new query type in G 1 that does not contain (θ, t 1 , ..., t p ). Therefore A 2 can never construct a query for γ in G 1 .
Secondly, we prove A 3 can never construct a query for γ in G 1 from all information given in the simulation. The query types in G 1 that A 3 can construct can be divided into two parts. Part one is all the query types in G 1 from A 1 , it has been proved that using this part can not construct a query for γ in G 1 . Part two is the extra query types in G 1 from A 3 compared with those from A 1 , they are constructed using one or several elements in ϒ = X ∪R ξ ∪x ∪{θ, L ξ }. Since the elements of ϒ that are in G 0 or G 1 only exist in X and R ξ , and since variables (t 1 , ..., t p ) are not relevant to constructing a query involving γ , A 3 has to transform them into (t 1 , ..., t p ). We do the following case analysis: 1) For X , A 3 has to transform it into X ξ , however, A 1 can also construct queries using X ξ . 2) For R ξ , since R ξ ⊆ T 2 (PK ) and d 2 is also not relevant to constructing a query involving γ , the transformation of R ξ belongs to PK , which can also be used by A 1 .
Therefore A 3 can never construct a query for γ in G 1 .
V. OUR INSTANTIATION
In this section, we instantiate our generic construction with an adaptively CPA secure CP-ABE scheme [5] , an endomorphism transform and the key blinding technique proposed in [21] . Since [13] is constructed based on [5] , for simplicity and for a fair comparison with [13] , we just present a concrete OABE-WoKE scheme based on [5] and just discuss CP-ABE here. Note that there is not a special requirement for the type of the underlying ABE, both CP or KP settings are suitable. Let e : G 0 ×G 0 → G 1 , where G 0 and G 1 are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, p ∈ (2 λ ), the generator of
The partial public key and master key are: 
Check 
. Select a polynomial q x for each node in the tree as the rule in . Beginning with the root node R, it chooses s ∈ R Z p and sets q R (0) = s. In the access tree, let Y be the set of leaf nodes in , the ciphertext is computed as CT = ( , C = Me(g, g) αs , C = h s , ∀y ∈ Y : C y = g q y (0) , C y = H (att(y)) q y (0) ). 
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of our two instantiations of OABE-WoKE schemes defined in VI.A.2 by comparing them with schemes [10] , [12] , [13] , [16] in theoretical and experimental aspects.
A. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 1) KEY ESCROW AND OUTSOURCED DECRYPTION Table 1 shows the problem of key escrow, feature of outsourced decryption and CPA secure of the scheme against key generators for each scheme. All of the schemes solve the key escrow problem. Moreover, the OABE-WoKE scheme can support outsourced decryption as opposed to [10] , [12] , [13] , and [16] . The last but not least, the OABE-WoKE scheme has been proved to be CPA secure against AA or MAA, however, none of the other four schemes achieve it.
2) EFFICIENCY
Since in [10] , it needs O(N 2 ) communication overhead in the setup phase and requires each user to store O(N 2 ) auxiliary key components except his own secret key, [12] uses [10] as a underlying scheme, we consider that the efficiency of [10] and [12] can also be improved. To make the comparison more scientific and fairer, we add the function, outsourced decryption to [13] and [16] by using the most commonly used key blinding technique [21] and keep other algorithms in [13] and [16] unchanged. We define them as the improved versions of [13] and [16] respectively and show them in the appendix.
We name the instantiation of [5] demonstrated in section V as our first instantiation and compare it with the improved version of [13] for the reason that [13] is also constructed based on [5] . To compare with the improved version of [16] , we instantiate the construction of OABE-WoKE with a stripped-down version of [16] and name it as our second instantiation. Specifically, we define that the public key and secret keys are generated by one authority in the strippeddown version of [16] . Table 3 shows the two comparisons in terms of storage overhead, communication overhead and computation overhead. The used symbols are defined in Table 2 . PK size and MK size denote the storage overhead of AA and MAA in regard to public key and master key respectively. PK size and MK size are nearly the same in the two comparisons. As for the rounds of communication in the generation of secret key, both of our two instantiations only need four rounds, which have prominent advantage compared with the improved version of [13] and [16] that require 11 and 14 rounds respectively. We find that the size of transmissive data in our two instantiations is bigger than that in their two competitive schemes when |A u | is bigger than a threshold; but the benefit is, the user can obtain transformation key without any computation. It is a tradeoff between more computation burden and bigger size of transmissive data.
In Table 3 , we evaluate the computation cost of TK. We can find that in the two comparisons, our two instantiations need much lower computation cost to generate TK. Our first instantiation consumes less 16 G 0 of computation cost comparing with the improved version of [13] . Our second instantiation consumes less 30G 0 of computation cost comparing with the improved version of [16] .
In fact, the efficiency of the OABE-WoKE scheme is determined by its underlying ABE scheme to a great extent. Due to the clever design of the key issuing protocol and the MAP transform, the two instantiations are more efficient than their competitive schemes.
B. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 1) IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We implement the four aforementioned schemes in Charm [24] . Charm is a framework developed to facilitate the rapid prototyping of cryptographic schemes and protocols, it is based on the Python language. We use the PBC library to implement the group operations and use a toolbox, ABEnc, to realize the access policies of ciphertext in our simulated schemes. The number of attributes used in the simulations is N = {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50}. All Charm routines utilize formal asymmetric groups [25] , hence we transform the simulated schemes to the asymmetric setting, and test them on two MNT asymmetric groups, ''MNT201'' and ''MNT224''. We also test the schemes on super-singular symmetric grouop ''SS512''. All our benchmarks are executed on a computer with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4590 CPU at 3.30GHz and 3314MB RAM running Ubuntu 16.04, the programming language is Python 3.5.2. aforementioned schemes. We can find that, on ''MNT201'', ''MNT224'' and ''SS512'', our two instantiations require less time compared with their respective competitive schemes. The time of TK generation approximately follows a linear relationship with the number of attributes. We also observe that the less number of attributes, the more prominent the difference between the time of TK generation in the two comparisons is. The reason is that the key issuing protocol in the OABE-WoKE scheme is more efficient than that in [13] and [16] . There exists the constant gaps between the two comparisons, and the two gaps lead to lower and lower influences with the increase of number of attributes. It indicates that the results are consistent with the theoretical analysis presented in previous subsection.
2) SIMULATION ANALYSIS
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we solved the key escrow problem and supported outsourced decryption in ABE simultaneously. We put forward a generic construction of OABE-WoKE based on the proposed MAP transform and key issuing protocol. In addition, we are the first to provide new security definitions for three types of adversaries where two semi-trusted key generators are included. Then we proved our construction to be CPA secure against any one of them. Finally, we presented the performance analysis for two instantiations of OABE-WoKE schemes, the results show our two instantiations are more efficient than their competitive schemes.
APPENDIX A IMPROVED VERSION OF [13]
We remain all the algorithms in [13] and we show an added algorithm GenTK in [13] . In fact, it still needs extra algorithms to achieve outsourced decryption, e.g. Transform out , Decrypt out , however, they are not our concern.
GenTK ( 
APPENDIX B IMPROVED VERSION OF [16]
Similar with improved version of [13] , we remain all the algorithms in [16] and we show an added algorithm GenTK in [16] . 
